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Local Taxation, 
Spending and Poverty:  
New Choices and Tax Justice 
 
Christine Cooper, Mike Danson and Geoff Whittam  
 
 
Introduction  
In the environment of the 2014 Independence Referendum, a number of key 
questions have been raised about the future Scotland we want to see and live in. 
Core to such discussions have been the interventions on wealth creation and 
benefits, by the leaders of the Conservatives and Labour Parties in Scotland, 
respectively. However, and as rigorously debated in the Whose Economy? Seminar 
Series (Danson and Trebeck, 2011), such questions need to be considered in their 
wider contexts to identify and analyse fully all aspects of ‘who pays?’ and ‘who 
benefits?’. Indeed, several of the papers to that seminar series echoed previous 
classical work on poverty and the welfare state by Townsend, Abel-Smith and others 
which confirmed there are some long-standing myths to be addressed. These 
commentaries have suggested that all is not what it seems in the review of statistics 
of income and benefits, and robust, objective and clinical assessment of the data is 
required, rather than a reliance on perceptions, accepted beliefs and headlines.  
 
This paper is focused on the particular role of local taxation in addressing poverty in 
Scotland. It is written as a contribution to the recently-muted debate on how the 
overall tax and benefit system operates at the local level and how the conspiracy 
across the political spectrum in Holyrood of the last few years to freeze the Council 
Tax has impacted on families and authorities. To undertake such analyses requires a 
look initially at the levels of poverty and inequality, the role of the tax system in 
redistribution and in raising public revenue, and how the welfare state and councils 
support those in deprivation and other difficulties. It then discusses problems with the 
current system before reviewing the impact of the Council Tax freeze. As this itself 
has led directly to a reduction in the flow of Council Tax Benefit to Scotland, and so 
into the Scottish economy, and in light of suggestions that this specific benefit should 
be abolished, there is a discussion of the implications of such policy choices and 
practices on those in poverty and on society as a whole. With major criticisms of 
Council Tax still relevant regardless of the freeze, the following section explores 
alternative forms of generating local tax revenues within a programme of pursuing 
tax justice. The final section concludes and summarises the paper. 
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Poverty, Inequality, Taxes and Welfare  
It is commonly believed that the UK has a 
progressive taxation system with the richer 
members of society paying higher 
proportions of their incomes in tax than the 
poor. The reality is and has been 
somewhat different for many years. 
Although now discontinued as a statistical 
series, the Government serial Economic 
Trends traditionally published figures on 
levels of actual tax paid according to 
income bands. This showed very clearly 
that consistently the poorest 10 per cent 
have been losing a greater proportion of 
their incomes in tax than the average, and 
indeed than the richest 10 per cent 
especially. We have a regressive tax 
system. The levels of inequality, having 
been comparable to those of most other 
developed and northern European 
economies up to the late 1970s, have 
escalated throughout the intervening 
period before falling marginally on some 
measures towards the end of Labour’s 
reign. Britain is now one of the most 
unequal and divided countries in the OECD 
and is returning to levels of inequity not 
seen since the 1930s (Lansley, 2012).  
And yet, the tax system exacerbates that 
state of unfairness in incomes with 
associated inequalities in health, life 
expectancy, well-being, education and the 
other indicators of a cohesive and inclusive 
society (Mooney and Scott, 2012; 
McKendrick et al., 2011; Danson and 
Trebeck, 2011). 
 
While the mantra of ‘we’re all in this 
together’ has metamorphosed into ‘the 
something for nothing culture’ (Johann 
Lamont, BBC 25th September 2012) and 
‘only 12 % are net generators of Scotland’s 
wealth’ (Ruth Davidson, BBC 7th October 
2012), the Sunday Times Rich List for 
2010 recorded that the ‘top 1,000 multi-
millionaires in the UK saw their collective 
wealth increase by 29.9 per cent on 2009 
levels – a whopping £77.25 billion. With a 
wealth stash of some £335.5 billion, this is 
almost twice the UK’s well-publicised and 
historically largest national debt’ (quoted in 
McKendrick et al., 2011, p.9). This is a 
strange backdrop against which to 
consider the failure of the post-war 
consensus to survive the attacks on the 
poorest in society, with those on benefits 
having to pay the price for the over-
consumption of the rich. 
Figure 1: How income inequality in the UK 
has come full circle 
There are over three quarters of a million 
Scots (780 000) living in relative poverty, a 
decline over the last five years but due to 
middle income groups suffering more 
during the recession so that there has 
been no reduction in absolute poverty 
(Scottish Government, 2012). Sharing their 
misery, children (17 per cent), working age 
adults (14 per cent) and pensioners (16 per 
cent) suffer about the same levels of 
material deprivation, while all those on 
benefits are relatively much worse off than 
their counterparts across most of Europe 
(OECD, 2012). 
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Now in a period of protracted and severe 
austerity, this failure to defend the welfare 
state and so the most vulnerable in society 
over the past three decades means that 
deepening poverty and deprivation are 
hitting those least able to resist. At the 
same time the richest few have seen these 
unprecedented gains, and all during a 
recession. The devastating effects of the 
growing inequality since the mid-1970s 
continue to impact on the poorest in the 
community who have lost out through 
changes in the taxation and benefits 
systems. The move away from progressive 
direct taxation to regressive indirect 
taxation has led to the people on the 
lowest incomes paying a greater 
percentage in tax than those on the highest 
levels of income: and the working poor 
have been particularly hard hit. While on 
average we pay 33 per cent of our income 
in tax, and the richest face similar levels 
overall to the rest of us, for the poorest this 
rises to 36 per cent (Sinfield, 2011). And 
the primary reasons for the systematic 
regressive nature of taxation in the UK are 
Council Tax – even with council tax benefit 
– and indirect taxes (such as VAT) 
generally (Cooper et al., 2010). 
 
 
Addressing the causes of poverty in 
Scotland has long been a defining 
objective of those in Scotland – including 
the Poverty Alliancei and the Oxfam 
Poverty Programmeii - who believe that 
inclusive, happy and contented societies 
are also economically successful. 
Research by Wilkinson and Picket (2011) 
and Stiglitz (2012) as well as the 
publications closer to home by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, Jimmy Reid 
Foundation, CPAG and others support the 
contention that a different economic and 
social model is required to really attack 
poverty in this country (Danson, 2012; 
Danson and Trebeck, 2011). The devolved 
powers at the disposal of the Scottish 
Government and Parliament, even as 
amended under the Scotland Act 2012, 
can have but limited impacts on inequality 
and poverty and so attention must be 
directed upwards to international forces 
and drivers (beyond the scope of this 
paper) and to the capacity within Scotland 
to allocate resources and to adjust taxes 
dedicated to fund local government. We 
now turn to consider the current system of 
local taxation before exploring what might 
be done to wage a war on poverty.  
Current system and problems 
The UK tax system is regressive (Jones, 
2005). While indirect taxes take-up 28 per 
cent of gross and 31 per cent of disposable 
income for the poorest, they absorb only 
14 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively, 
of the incomes of the richest. Critically, the 
only direct tax which exacerbates this is 
the Council Tax. The Council Tax system 
followed Conservative issues with the 
former rates and the need for revaluations 
which would redress the declines in the 
shares paid by property owners after 
sustained house price inflation, and the 
Figure 2: Top executive and employee pay compared, 
2000-2011 
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disastrous experiment with the Poll Tax. 
The new Council Tax approach to local 
government financing was never intended 
to be progressive and from the outset 
contained a regressive element. The 
Council Tax bill for any house is 
determined by the valuation band in which 
the dwelling is placed, the tax levels set by 
the local council for the area and the 
personal circumstances of the people 
normally living there. Each house is 
included in one of eight broad bands on the 
local valuation list, ranging from A to H.  
With local levels of this tax effectively 
frozen for the last five years and more, and 
as the actual rates levied did not vary by 
more than £3 per week for Band D 
dwellings across mainland Scotland, our 
analysis from 2007 can be applied as 
indicative of today’s picture. On average, 
by 2007 “the Council Tax costs the poorest 
4.9 per cent of their gross income – even 
after Council Tax deductions and Council 
Tax Benefits – but only 1.7 per cent for the 
richest” (Cooper et al., 2010). Welcomed 
initially as the replacement for the Poll Tax, 
albeit that it exacerbated the regressive 
nature of the tax system overall, by 2000 
fuelled by the “gearing effect”iii and above- 
inflation rises, the Council Tax caused 
significant antagonism. Having to fund 
expansions in centrally-sponsored service 
areas, by 2003 Council Tax bills had 
almost doubled while earnings were only 
up by half. The average Council Tax bill 
increased by almost 13 per cent in 2003 
alone so that the average paid for a Band 
D home occupied by two adults was 
£1102—the first time it had exceeded 
£1000 (FT leader, September 23, 2003). 
The Council Tax impacts particularly 
harshly on certain groupsiv: for example, 
pensioners whose incomes do not match 
rises in average earnings. Proposals to 
modify the Tax to address such issue were 
explored by several commissions and 
inquiries including the “The Balance of 
Spending Review”, a report from the New 
Policy Institute (NPI) produced alongside 
the Local Government Information Unit, the 
Lyons Committee and, particular to 
Scotland, the Burt inquiry into local 
government finance. To address the 
regressive element to the Tax, it was 
suggested that additional bands could be 
introduced at the top of the scale; however, 
this could only offer a partial solution, and 
then only if there was a close correlation 
between income and property values. Of 
course, for many pensioners, there is no 
such simple relationship and this tax is 
especially regressive for them. The 
obvious solution, proposed by the Layfield 
Commission in 1976, was to introduce 
local income taxation. 
Applying the analyses and conclusions 
from the various reports and inquiries, 
proposals for a local income tax were 
encapsulated in The Council Tax Abolition 
and Service Tax Introduction (Scotland) Bill 
which went before the Scottish Parliament 
on February 1, 2006; this was rejected by 
the Parliament, however. The promise by 
the incoming minority SNP Government to 
follow a similar line and replace the tax 
with a different, flat rate local income tax 
also came to nought. In light of the threats 
for more radical solutions becoming too 
popular (see discussion on the proposals 
for a Scottish Service Tax based on 
incomes and ability to pay in Cooper et al., 
2010), previous administrations launched 
inquiries into how the Council Tax could be 
reformed (Burt et al, 2006) or a flat rate 
local income tax introduced. The latter 
tended to be as regressive as the Council 
Tax and did not contribute to addressing 
the wider problems with the tax and benefit 
systems catalogued above; they also failed 
to offer to raise even the revenues of the 
present Council Tax. The political problems 
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of undertaking the occasional but inevitable 
and necessary revaluations of individual 
properties to ensure that differential house 
price and value inflation across bands was 
captured had postponed serious reviews of 
the Tax. As a means to postpone such 
debates, the Labour-LibDem Scottish 
Government established the Local 
Government Finance Review Committee 
under the lead of Peter Burt which reported 
to the Parliament and Government on 
different options and alternatives (Burt et 
al., 2006).  
Amongst the conclusions of a well-
researched and argued report, the 
Committee rejected the introduction of a 
local income tax on the grounds that there 
were objections both in principle and in 
practice including: wealth, as well as 
income, should be taxed; additional income 
tax is a disincentive to work, which is 
economically undesirable; and yield would 
be more volatile than under a property tax” 
(Burt et al., 2006, p9). They also argued 
that they “were unable to recommend 
either continuation or reform of council tax” 
(2006, p.10). Ultimately they recommended 
“a new progressive Local Property Tax 
(LPT) be introduced, based on the capital 
value of individual properties and payable 
by households occupying properties 
(whether as owner-occupiers or as 
tenants) and by owners of second homes 
and unoccupied properties. LPT satisfies 
our criteria” (Burt et al., 2006, p.10). As the 
Green Party subsequently argued, while 
much of the analysis by the Committee 
was sound, a Land Value Tax would have 
been a superior solution so that the LPT, or 
more correctly the underpinnings for that 
development, should have led logically 
onto a proposal for further change along 
the lines of a land-based taxation.  
Before exploring such alternatives to the 
Council Tax, the next section considers the 
short term freeze that should have allowed 
time for such opportunities to be examined 
properly. 
Impact of the Council Tax Freeze 
Initially introduced as a short-term measure 
before the intention to introduce some form 
of Local Income Tax (LIT), the freezing of 
Council Tax in Scotland is now entering its 
fifth consecutive year. The LIT appears to 
have been forgotten about, possibly due to 
economic priorities associated with the 
recession. The reasoning for the 
continuation of the freeze is due to its 
political popularity. The payment of public 
goods, such as the services provided by 
local authorities, exploits the classic ‘free 
rider’ problem. Everyone can benefit from 
the provision of a public good and there is 
every incentive not to pay for the provision 
if it is going to be provided anyway. 
Therefore, the individual derives a benefit 
from a freeze in council tax, less tax to pay, 
but the individual may not directly be 
affected by the reduction in service of a 
specific public good, and therefore ‘free-
rides’. Of course, if everyone utilises the 
same logic then the individual(s) gain but 
‘society’ loses. 
Whilst Council Tax has been frozen, 
inflation has continued. If additional funding 
was not made available then the real value 
of service would decline. To compensate 
for inflation and in an attempt to maintain 
the real value of services provided, the 
Scottish Government originally transferred 
an additional £70 million per year to 
Scottish Councils. The Government now 
expects councils to finance this themselves 
from their general budgets. It is debatable 
whether this will happen given the 
anticipated cost of maintaining the same 
level of services in the near future. 
According to Bell (2012), utilising the 
approach adopted by the Office of Budget 
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Responsibility (OBR) in England, Scottish 
local authorities would need to generate an 
additional £300 million between 2012-13 
and 2016-17 for the same level of service 
delivery to be maintained. The figure is 
calculated on the assumption that Council 
Tax levels in England would grow at 
around the same rate as price inflation 
over the period. If this degree of increase is 
not attained, then a larger compensation 
from the Scottish Government to Scottish 
local authorities would be required to 
maintain the same level of services. Bell 
(2012) argues that this will make local 
authorities even more dependent on 
central government, and hence less able to 
exercise autonomy over decision making. 
The alternative would be to introduce 
‘efficiency’ savings. Whilst such savings 
can be made, often they tend to be a ‘one-
off’ (for example, the merging of the police 
and fire services into one national 
administration will tend to suggest costs 
can be cut through redundancies and 
rationalisation amongst higher grades, 
leading to loss of experience as well as 
reduced duplication).  Subsequently in 
such cases, as with continuing efficiency 
savings, there are the standard worsening 
terms and conditions as initial plans to 
contain services within diminishing budgets 
proves impossible. So, savings generated 
by austerity cuts will impact indirectly, with 
services eventually having to be reduced 
leading to the loss of employment and 
posts for many low paid workers. Job 
reductions may happen also through ‘out-
sourcing’, the creation of ‘arms-length 
companies’ or the placing of contracts with 
third sector organisations such as social 
enterprises, usually resulting in fewer jobs 
and employment with inferior pay and 
conditions.  
It is argued that a further aspect of the 
Council Tax freeze is that it has favoured 
the owners of higher valued properties 
more than those in lower valued properties. 
It has been estimated that those in Band G 
and Band H homes will have saved £116.4 
million since the start of the freeze in 2008-
09 (Sunday Herald 4 March 2012). The 
freeze benefits the higher valued 
properties because of the way Council Tax 
is structured. A Band H home is always 
twice the bill for a Band D home and three 
times the bill for a Band A home within 
each council area. The savings from the 
freeze work in the same way, a Band H 
home saves three times as much in cash 
terms as a Band A home. If the freeze 
continues on current trends, with subsidies 
offsetting the effects of inflation being felt 
elsewhere in household finances, then by 
the end of the Parliament in 2015-16 the 
country’s Band G and H homes will have 
enjoyed a cumulative tax break of almost 
£300 million. 
On the other hand, the Scottish 
Government argues that households on 
low to middle incomes appear to have a 
proportionally greater increase in net 
household income as a result of the freeze 
than households on higher incomes. 
Currently, low income households may be 
eligible for Council Tax Benefit (CTB)v.  
Reform of Council Tax Benefit 
The UK Government is to abolish Council 
Tax Benefit (CTB) in April 2013 and reduce 
by 10 per cent the amount of funding 
available for its replacement. CTB is the 
support people on low incomes receive 
through local authorities to help 
households to pay their Council Tax. 
Anyone on a low income, with limited 
capital, is entitled to claim CTB. People on 
other benefits, for example income support 
or income based job-seekers allowance, 
can have all of their council tax paid; 
however, given that council tax is 
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calculated on a household basis, if other 
adults earning income are living in the 
same household, then an individual may 
not be entitled to the full amount of CTB. 
The people most affected by this change 
by the UK Government will be the people 
on the lowest incomes.  
The implication of the changes at the UK 
level is to ‘localise’ CTB across England 
and the devolved nations. Grants are to be 
provided to each local authority in England 
and to the Welsh and Scottish 
governments, this will be 90 per cent of 
what was previously paid in CTB. There is 
no obligation for these bodies to implement 
the 10 per cent cut, the same level of 
benefit could be maintained, but the 
implication of this is that savings (and so 
cuts) will have to be made elsewhere. The 
UK government argues that this move to 
‘localism’ will lead local authorities to 
pursue more enterprising activities which 
will result in greater employment 
opportunitiesvi. 
However, a move away from a centralised 
system can create a greater administrative 
burden resulting in expenditure on a 
greater bureaucracy to oversee the new 
system. Additionally, it will provide a 
disincentive to increase Council Tax rates 
and can dissuade the provision of, for 
example, social housing. There have been 
accusations that the scheme will result in 
‘social-cleansing’, that is, people on low 
incomes will no longer be able to afford 
housing in ‘better-off’ areasvii.  
The Scottish Government has announced 
that it will not implement the 10 per cent 
cut in CTB in Scotland, at a cost of £40 
million in the first financial year. The 
Scottish Government and COSLA, on 
behalf of local authorities, have agreed to 
cover the cost of this cut in 2013-14: the 
Scottish Government will provide £23 
million and COSLA will provide £17 
millionviii. In effect, this means that the 
status quo can be maintained, again at 
some cost to local authorities. Whilst this 
approach in Scotland will lead to protection 
for the most vulnerable in society, whether 
this can be maintained in the longer term if, 
for example, the UK government continues 
to cut CTB progressively is debatable. The 
solution in the longer term would be to 
develop a local tax system which is 
suitable for redistribution purposes and 
serves to combat the regressive nature of 
the current council tax.  
Alternatives and Tax Justice  
Land value tax 
Introduction 
A political and economic case has been 
made for replacing the Council Tax with a 
Land Value Tax (see for example, Jones, 
2008). One of the underlying assumptions 
in the case for a Land Value Tax is that the 
value of land is not created by landowners, 
but first by nature (beautiful scenery, 
natural resources and so on) and second 
by other people and the community at 
large through their economic and social 
activities. This value includes the creation 
of infrastructure and improved services by 
the public sector through general taxation. 
But, when land is largely privately owned, 
land-owners, rather than the community as 
a whole, benefit from public sector 
expenditure. In effect, land owners profit at 
the expense of other people, especially 
those who do not own property (and so 
have to rent), and at the expense of society 
as a whole, whose investments in 
infrastructure and public services are 
responsible for rising land values. 
In Scotland, while it is difficult to find exact 
figures, a significant amount of land is 
owned by a very few people. The total land 
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mass of Scotland is 19,460,000 acres. Of 
this 18,925,000 acres are rural (15,722,000 
acres are privately owned). The most 
telling land owning statistic is that 
9,433,000 acres are owned by 969 people 
(Wightman, 2010). It has been reported 
that large landowners are also among the 
major recipients of subsidies from the EU; 
for example, the Sunday Herald revealed 
that between 2000 and 2004, around £115 
million was given to the one hundred 
largest beneficiaries in Scotland. 
Renewable energy subsidies are also 
benefitting large landowners; it was 
reported in 2010 that the Duke of 
Roxburgh, who owns 55,136 acres, 
planned to develop a 48-turbine wind farm 
which “would generate an estimated £30m 
a year, shared with developers. About 
£17m of this would come from subsidies 
from consumers”ix.  
Political support for a land value tax 
Land value taxation is supported by the 
Green Party. In 2003, Robin Harper won 
the support of the Scottish Parliament for a 
further investigation of land value tax (LVT) 
as a radical replacement for business rates 
and Council Tax. Harper won the backing 
of the SNP and some Liberal Democrats, 
while most Labour MSPs abstained and 
the Conservatives voted ‘no’. A Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation Report (Tackling 
housing market volatility in the UK: a 
progress report) argued for a revaluation of 
property for Council Tax purposes "with a 
view to gradually transforming it into a 
national land and property tax"x. But as 
Travers (2012) argues, by far the most 
important element in considering any 
reform to local taxation is the fate of 
Margaret Thatcher following the 
introduction of the Community Charge in 
1990. National politicians fear that if they 
reform a revenue source as visible and 
unpopular as Council Tax they could be 
driven from office. 
Underlying Philosophy 
Land Value Tax was first proposed in the 
19th century by Henry George, an 
American economist from Philadelphia. A 
foundation set up in his name still 
proselytises his ideas. They believe that 
landowners become richer with no 
productive effort on their part, because as 
population rises and as labour specializes, 
or as capital invents, they create a more 
productive economy, which raises the land 
value in the region, so that the rent rises 
with it, enriching the land owners. This was 
explained by Henry George's proposal as 
put forth in his 1879 book Progress and 
Poverty, which was written as a result of 
trying to consider why, in the advance of 
economic sufficiency, the rich were getting 
richer and the poor getting poorer. He 
reasoned that all economic activity is 
ultimately connected back to nature and its 
resources. The land (area, and natural 
resources, of which no human has created 
more) is used by individuals to create 
wealth; the wages of their labour. Some of 
this wealth is, in the form of capital goods, 
used to create more wealth; the interest 
returned on capital. Those who own the 
land charge rent to labour and capital to 
use the land. As regional development 
occurs, the land value increases, enriching 
the owners of land without any effort on 
their part. The land owners have an unfair 
advantage in land relative to the labourers 
and capitalists who do not own land. The 
land owners are able, through the rise in 
rent, to collect the increase in income that 
labour and capital achieve through 
specialization and invention.xi  
Some supporters of a land value tax 
believe that it is counter-productive to try to 
redistribute wealth through progressive 
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income tax. They believe in fact that any 
form of taxation except for land value tax is 
going to dampen down the economy, 
reduce our verve for work and money 
making. To them, income tax punishes 
productivity and sales tax punishes the 
poor more than the rich. Indeed they also 
believe that even progressive forms of 
income and/or corporation tax cannot 
redistribute income. 
It is also argued that LVT will encourage 
people to invest in and look after their land. 
Since land is taxed rather than buildings, 
this will encourage people to make the best 
use of their land, perhaps by building on it. 
Absentee landowners who allow land and 
property to deteriorate are discouraged, as 
are speculators who hold onto land without 
making any improvements. Development, 
on the other hand, which makes use of 
land, is encouraged. 
The case for Land Value Tax is 
strengthened in a modern economy. It 
could be argued that the combined effects 
of globalization and the growth of the 
Internet could turn large areas of 
commerce into tax-avoidance zones. In 
these circumstances, governments wanting 
to maintain welfare states have either got 
to tax the products of the information 
revolution - like the proposed 'bit-tax' on 
digital data, which needs global agreement 
to be effective - or to find a domestic tax 
that is easy to raise and cannot be easily 
avoided. Since land cannot move (or be 
shipped to a tax haven), it is argued that 
land tax makes sense in a modern 
economy. 
How it works in practice 
Of course there are many forms which a 
Land Value Tax could take. It could be 
levied as a split tax on both land and 
buildings. For example, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania has operated a split tax since 
1913. The land-value tax was kept at a low 
multiple of twice the rate of property tax, 
mainly at the behest of steel companies. 
By 1979, the steel industry was dying and 
so was Pittsburgh. So the city increased 
the land-value tax to five times the property 
tax rate. According to supporters of LVT, 
the result looks dramatic. Construction of 
commercial and industrial premises in the 
city rose by 70% in the 1980s over the 
previous decade. Today Pittsburgh has 
pretty much converted from heavy industry 
to being a service city. But, the city also 
subsidised companies wanting to develop. 
One study compared the similar cities of 
Scranton and Wilkes-Barre. In 1979, 
Scranton doubled the land-value tax rate 
and abolished property taxes on new 
buildings. Wilkes-Barre stuck to a flat-rate 
property tax. By 1981, new building activity 
had increased by 22 per cent in Scranton 
and decreased by 44 per cent in Wilkes-
Barre from the previous three years. The 
state government of Pennsylvania was so 
impressed that in 1998 it passed a law 
allowing all the state's major boroughs to 
introduce split-rate land and property 
taxes. 
Variants of the tax, which is an annual 
charge for the occupation of land, as 
opposed to taxes on earnings, profits, or 
savings, have been adopted in 
Pennsylvania, New South Wales, Hong 
Kong, and Denmark. Allentown, 
Philadelphia introduced land value tax in 
1996xii.  
Ways forward  
One suggestion would be to use an LVT in 
place of business rates. This would at least 
capture the large landowners who run 
hotels from their estates and farm the land. 
But it wouldn’t capture Brian Souter’s 
castle! 
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Another possibility would be to try to close 
the tax loophole noted above which allows 
companies to avoid capital gains tax by 
setting up off-shore tax havens. It could be 
expected that this would generate 
significant sums of money. 
If this isn’t allowed, it might be possible to 
introduce this tax but only for companies 
which have made gains on sales of their 
Scottish land but haven’t paid the current 
Capital Gains Tax. 
Mirroring developments in other EU 
countries, a good way forward might be to 
have a land value tax on properties over 
(say) £300,000 or with an acreage over a 
particular level. 
An Alternative – a One-Off Wealth Tax 
Again reflecting discussions and initiatives 
in other EU member states, Professor 
Greg Philo has proposed a wealth tax in 
the form of a one-off tax levy of 20 per cent 
on the wealthiest 10 per cent of the 
population in the UK. 
The proposed levy would be sufficient to 
pay off the national debt thereby avoiding 
the need for deep cuts in public services. 
The calculations underpinning the proposal 
are that total personal wealth in the UK is 
£9,000bn; this wealth is mostly 
concentrated at the top, so the richest 10 
per cent own £4,000bn, with an average 
per household of £4m. The bottom half of 
our society owns just 9 per cent. The 
wealthiest hold the bulk of their money in 
property or pensions, and some in financial 
assets and objects such as antiques and 
paintings. 
A one-off tax of just 20 per cent on the 
wealth of the richest group would pay the 
national debt and dramatically reduce the 
deficit, since interest payments on the debt 
are a large part of government spending. 
This tax of 20 per cent, graduated so the 
very richest paid the most, would raise 
£800bn. 
A YouGov poll from June 2010 suggested 
that 74 per cent of the population would 
favour a one-off tax on the wealthiest 6 
million people in Britainxiii. The government 
statistics on wealth which underpin the 
proposed levy can be found at – 
http://www.glasgowmediagroup.org/images
/stories/pdf/wealth_in_gb_2006_2008_tcm
77-169961.pdf. 
Conclusion  
The UK, and within that Scotland, is a 
deeply unequal and divided society. In 
terms of poverty, efficiency and 
performance, it compares unfavourably 
with many of the more successful 
economies in Europe (Danson, 2012). 
Levels of poverty and inequality are directly 
associated with these poor development 
indicators, and commentators forecast 
austerity and failure will continue many 
years into the future (e.g. Elliott and 
Atkinson, 2012). Within the constraints of 
the current devolution settlement, the 
Scottish Government has continued with 
the Council Tax freeze with the support of 
other parties but this is progressively 
limiting the capacity of local authorities to 
deliver the services that many of the 
poorest rely on to ameliorate their poverty 
and deprivation. Exacerbating the austerity 
cuts and the failure of successive 
Westminster governments to protect the 
poor and reverse cycles of inequality, the 
tax system is regressive and the Council 
Tax is a major contributor to that inequity. 
The Council Tax freeze has directly helped 
the poor who do not claim Council Tax 
Benefit and those who are just above the 
threshold for support; however, they have 
also been suffering the most from 
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increasing cuts in local council employment 
and services whilst higher income groups 
have benefited absolutely more from the 
freezing of the tax.  
Our previous work (Cooper et al., 2010) 
explored these issues and led to the 
publication of a Bill for a progressive local 
income tax. But, even in that work we 
argued that in the longer term the Council 
Tax should be replaced with a tax based 
on land value. Given that the ownership of 
land is even more concentrated than 
incomes and other forms of property, it has 
been suggested here that, in the wider 
debates on Scotland’s future, consideration 
should be given to introducing a land value 
tax. The UK public debt per capita is far in 
excess of our northern neighbours, 
approaching the position of being one of 
the highest in the OECD countries and 
soon to be surpassed by Iceland’s which is 
falling. Therefore, it is also proposed that a 
wealth tax should be introduced, first as a 
one-off move to reverse the significant 
gains made by the richest during the 
recession and to raise revenues to begin to 
address the austerity cuts of the current 
period. That tackling the deprivation and 
unhappiness of the poor should be a 
priority in Scotland’s immediate future 
should go without saying at this time, the 
obverse of this campaign is the need to tax 
away the unearned fortunes of the rich to 
pay for the attack on poverty. 
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End Notes 
 
i http://povertyalliance.org/news_pubs/sapr 
ii http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/whose-economy-
seminar-papers-complete-series-188809 
iii By the middle of last decade, the proportion of 
taxation raised locally was typically 25 per cent and 
the amount distributed through government grants 
75 per cent. As a result, Council Tax increases 
suffer from the ‘gearing effect, whereby the need to 
raise 1 per cent in local revenue results in a 4 per 
cent% increase in the council tax. 
iv There are discounts and exemptions for some 
council tax payers such as people living alone, 
students, and the disabled. For people on low 
incomes there is also the possibility of applying for 
Council Tax Benefit. However, for some groups, 
such as pensioners, there is a reluctance to apply 
for ‘means tested benefits’ and hence many do not 
apply. 
vhttp://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/09/5
750/21 
vi http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm123.pdf 
viihttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/poo
r-families-lose-out-in-council-tax-benefit-cuts-
8005962.html  
viiihttp://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2012/
04/counciltax19042012  
ix http://reidfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/QuicknoteLand.pdf  
x http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/housing-market-
volatility-progress 
xi Jack Jones, http://www.tpaine.org/tphgprop.htm 
xii www.hallwatch.org/faxbank/landtax/index_html  
xiii Further details including the full results of the poll 
can be found at – 
http://www.glasgowmediagroup.org/ 
